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2013 National Environmental Moot Court 
Competition Problem 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT 
 
______________________________________ 
NEW UNION WILDLIFE                       ) 
FEDERATION,                                        ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant,                                ) 
     v.                                                           ) 
NEW UNION DEPARTMENT OF         ) 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,    )  C.A. No. 13-1246 
Intervenor-Appellant,                            ) 
     v.                                                           ) 
JIM BOB BOWMAN,                               ) 
Defendant-Appellee,                               ) 
______________________________________ ) 
ORDER 
Following the issuance of the Order of the District Court 
dated June 1, 2012, in Civ. 149-2012, the New Union Wildlife 
Federation (“NUWF” or “Plaintiff”) and the New Union 
Department of Environmental Protection (“NUDEP”) each filed a 
Notice of Appeal.  NUWF takes issue with the decision of the 
lower court with respect to its holding: that NUWF lacked 
standing to bring a citizen suit against Jim Bob Bowman 
(“Bowman” or “Defendant”) pursuant to Clean Water Act (CWA) § 
505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006), for a violation of §§ 301(a) and 404 
of the CWA, id. §§ 1311(a), 1344; that there is no continuing 
violation as required for subject matter jurisdiction under § 
505(a) of the CWA, id. § 1365(a); that NUWF’s citizen suit is 
barred by NUDEP’s diligent prosecution of Bowman under § 
505(b) of the CWA, id. § 1365(b); and that Bowman did not violate 
§ 404 of the CWA, id. § 1344, because he did not discharge 
dredged or fill material to a water of the United States.  NUDEP 
takes issue with the decision of the lower court with respect to its 
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holdings that NUWF did not have standing to bring its citizen 
suit and that Bowman did not violate § 404 of the CWA, id. § 
1344. 
Therefore, it is hereby ordered that the parties brief all of the 
following issues: 
1. Whether NUWF has standing to sue Jim Bob Bowman for 
violating the CWA.  (NUWF and NUDEP argue that 
NUWF does have standing and that the court below erred 
in granting the Bowman’s motion for summary judgment 
on this issue; Bowman argues that NUWF does not have 
standing and that the court below was correct in granting 
summary judgment on this issue.) 
2. Whether there is a continuing or ongoing violation as 
required by § 505(a) of the CWA for subject matter 
jurisdiction.  (NUWF argues that there is a continuing 
violation because dredge and fill material is still present 
in the former wetlands and that the court below erred in 
granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on 
the issue; Bowman and NUDEP argue that the violations 
are wholly past because Bowman ceased his activities on 
July 15 and that the court below was correct in granting 
summary judgment on this issue.) 
3. Whether NUWF’s citizen suit has been barred by 
NUDEP’s diligent prosecution of Bowman as set out in § 
505(b) of the CWA.  (NUWF argues that NUDEP’s actions 
do not satisfy the diligent prosecution requirements of § 
505 and that the court below erred in granting summary 
judgment on this issue; Bowman and NUDEP argue that 
NUDEP’s prosecution of and consent decree with 
Bowman satisfy the requirements for diligent prosecution 
and the court below was correct in granting summary 
judgment on this issue.) 
4. Whether Bowman violated the CWA when he moved 
dredged and fill material from one part of a wetland 
adjacent to navigable water to another part of the same 
wetland.  (NUWF and NUDEP argue that Bowman’s 
actions satisfy all of the elements required for a violation 
of §§ 301(a) and 404, including addition, and that the 
court below erred in granting summary judgment on this 
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issue; Bowman argues that NUWF cannot satisfy the 
elements of a CWA violation and that the court below was 
correct in granting summary judgment on this issue.) 
 
SO ORDERED. 
Entered this 14th day of September, 2012. 
 
[NOTE: No decisions decided or documents dated after September 
1, 2012 may be cited either in the briefs or in oral argument.] 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW UNION 
______________________________________ 
NEW UNION WILDLIFE                        ) 
FEDERATION,                                         ) 
Plaintiff,                                                    ) 
     v.                                                            ) 
NEW UNION DEPARTMENT OF          ) 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,     ) C.A. No. 13-1246 
Intervenor,                                                 ) 
     v.                                                            ) 
JIM BOB BOWMAN,                                ) 
Defendant,                                                 ) 
_______________________________________ ) 
 
The New Union Wildlife Federation (“NUWF” or “Plaintiff”) 
filed an action under Clean Water Act (CWA) § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 
1365 (2006), against Jim Bob Bowman (“Bowman” or 
“Defendant”) for filling wetlands without a permit in violation of 
§§ 301(a) and 404 of the CWA. Id. §§ 1311(a), 1344.  The New 
Union Department of Environmental Protection (“NUDEP”) 
intervened in this action.  After discovery, Plaintiff and 
Defendant filed cross motions for summary judgment.  This Court 
grants Defendant’s motion on all grounds and denies Plaintiff’s 
motion on all grounds. 
I. FINDINGS OF FACT 
Bowman owns one thousand acres of wooded or previously 
wooded land adjacent to the Muddy River near the town of 
Mudflats in the State of New Union.  The Muddy River forms the 
border between New Union and Progress at that point and for at 
least forty miles both upstream and downstream from Bowman’s 
property.  The river is more than five-hundred feet wide and more 
than six feet deep where it borders Bowman’s property.  It is 
commonly used for miles both upstream and downstream of this 
point for recreational navigation.  Bowman’s thousand acres 
includes 650 feet of shoreline on the Muddy River.  The property 
is wholly within the one-hundred year flood plain of the Muddy.  
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol4/iss1/1
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Portions of the flood plain and Bowman’s property are inundated 
every year when the river is high.  Bowman’s property is 
hydrologically connected to the Muddy and is covered with trees 
and other vegetation characteristic of wetlands.  The parties 
agree that the property is a wetland, as determined by the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers’ (the Corp’s) Wetlands Determination 
Manual. 
On June 15, 2011, Bowman commenced land clearing 
operations.  He used bulldozers to knock down trees, level other 
vegetation, and push the trees and vegetation into windrows.  
Bowman then burned the windrows.  Next, he used a bulldozer to 
dig trenches and pushed the trees and leveled vegetation remains 
and ashes into them.  He leveled the resulting field, again 
pushing soil from high portions of the field into the trenches and 
low lying portions of the field.  Finally, he formed a wide ditch or 
swale that ran from the back of his property to the river in order to 
drain the field into the Muddy.  Bowman completed this work on 
or about July 15, 2011.  Bowman left a strip of land 
approximately 150 feet wide adjacent to the Muddy to clear after 
it had drained because it was the most difficult part of the 
property to work with the bulldozer, especially when it was 
saturated. This strip runs along the 650 foot length of river 
frontage on his property. 
NUWF is a not for profit corporation organized under the 
laws of New Union.  Its purpose is to protect the fish and wildlife 
of the state by protecting their habitats, among other things.  It is 
a membership organization funded by members’ dues and 
contributions.  Members elect its Board of Directors, the 
governing body of the organization, which in turn elects the 
officers, including the President. 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On July 1, 2011, shortly after its members became aware of 
Bowman’s activities, NUWF sent a notice of its intent to sue 
Bowman under § 505 of the CWA, id. § 1365, the citizen suit 
provision, to Bowman, EPA, and the State of New Union/NUDEP.  
The EPA has properly delegated authority to implement the CWA 
to NUDEP.  Bowman does not contest the validity of the notice. 
5
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NUDEP contacted Bowman shortly thereafter and sent him a 
notice of violation informing him that he had violated both state 
and federal law by clearing the field.  Although Bowman 
maintained he had not violated state or federal law, he entered 
into a settlement agreement with NUDEP, under which he 
agreed not to clear more wetlands in the area.  He also agreed to 
convey to NUDEP a conservation easement on the 150 foot wide 
strip of still wooded property adjacent to the Muddy that he had 
not yet cleared plus an additional 75 foot buffer zone between 
that wooded area and the new field.  He agreed to construct and 
maintain a year-round wetland on that 75 foot buffer zone.  The 
conservation easement allows public entry for appropriate, day-
use-only, recreational purposes, requires Bowman to keep the 
easement area in its natural state, and forbids him from 
developing it in any way other than constructing and maintaining 
the artificial wetland.  NUDEP and Bowman incorporated their 
agreement into an administrative order issued by NUDEP to 
Bowman, which Bowman consented to on August 1, 2011.  A state 
statute virtually identical in relevant parts to §§ 309 (a) and (g) of 
the CWA, id. §§ 1319 (a), (g), grants NUDEP authority to issue 
such administrative orders.  Although the statute authorizes 
NUDEP to include an administrative penalty of up to $125,000 in 
such orders, NUDEP included no penalty is the order to Bowman. 
On August 10, 2011, after issuing the administrative order to 
Bowman, NUDEP chose to bring suit in federal court and filed a 
complaint against Bowman in this Court under § 505 of the CWA. 
See id. § 1365(g) (defining “citizen as “a person or persons having 
an interest which may be or is adversely affected”); id. § 1362(5) 
(including “State, municipality, commission, or political 
subdivision of a State” within the definition of “person”). 
On August 30, 2011, NUWF filed its own § 505 complaint 
with this Court seeking civil penalties and an order requiring 
Bowman to remove the fill material and restore the wetlands.  On 
September 15, 2012, it filed a motion to intervene in the NUDEP 
§ 505 action, to consolidate the NUDEP and NUWF actions, and 
an opposition to entry of the decree proposed by NUDEP in the 
NUDEP § 505 action.  At about the same time, NUDEP filed a 
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On September 5, 2011, in its own § 505 case, NUDEP filed a 
motion to enter a decree, the terms of which are identical to the 
state administrative order.  Bowman consented to both the 
motion and the decree.  This motion is still pending. 
Also in September 2011, Bowman observed that the field had 
sufficiently drained to plant and sowed it with winter wheat. The 
field includes all of his property except the 225 foot wide easement 
adjacent to the river. 
On November 1, 2011, at a status conference on both cases, 
this Court notified the parties that it was not acting on any of the 
motions in either the NUDEP or the NUWF cases for the present 
besides NUDEP’s motion to intervene in the NUWF case; this 
was done without prejudice to NUDEP’s rights to enforce 
violations of its proposed decree or of NUWF’s rights to continue 
with its cause of action.  This Court granted NUDEP’s motion to 
intervene in NUWF’s § 505 action, the case which we address 
herein. 
After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment.  Jim Bob Bowman filed a motion for summary 
judgment on four grounds: 1) NUWF lacks standing because 
neither it nor its members suffered an injury in fact fairly 
traceable to Bowman’s alleged violations; 2) this Court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction because any violations are wholly 
past; 3) this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the 
State of New Union has already taken an enforcement action and 
fully resolved the violations; and 4) this Court lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction because a key element of a CWA cause of 
action is not satisfied: addition.  NUWF filed a motion for 
summary judgment on one ground: Bowman violated the CWA 
because he added dredge and fill material to navigable waters 
from a point source without a § 404 permit.  NUDEP joined 
Bowman in his motion for summary judgment on the second 
(continuing violation) and third (diligent prosecution) issues and 
joined NUWF in its motion for summary judgment on the first 
(standing) and fourth (CWA violation) issues. 
III. STANDING 
Under settled law, to have standing to sue, a plaintiff must 
prove: (1) an injury in fact (2) that is fairly traceable to the 
7
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alleged violations and (3) that is redressable by the court. Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).  In environmental 
cases, injury in fact may be aesthetic rather than economic. 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).  Where an 
organization such as NUWF is a plaintiff, it must prove that it 
represents individual members who can demonstrate standing.  
In support of standing, NUWF submitted affidavits from three of 
its members, Dottie Milford, Zeke Norton, and Effie Lawless.  
Bowman deposed all three.  In summary, the three testified that 
they use the Muddy for recreational boating and fishing, often 
picnicking on its banks, on or in the vicinity of Bowman’s 
property.  They testified they are aware that wetlands serve 
valuable functions in maintaining the integrity of rivers, 
including the Muddy, both acting to absorb sediment and 
pollutants and serving as buffers for flooding.  Although they 
cannot see a difference in the land from the river or its banks, 
they are aware of the differences and feel a loss from the 
destruction of the wetlands, fearing the Muddy is more polluted 
as a result and will be far more polluted if other adjacent 
wetlands are cleared and drained for agricultural uses.  Milford 
testified that the Muddy looks more polluted to her than it did 
prior to Bowman’s activities.  In addition, Norton testified that he 
has frogged the area for years for recreational and subsistence 
purposes.  The Bowman property had been especially good for 
frogging; Norton could always count on getting a dozen good sized 
frogs in the right season.  Now there are no frogs in the drained 
field and he is lucky to find two or three good sized frogs in the 
remaining woods and buffer area.  Norton admitted on cross-
examination at his deposition that the Bowman property was 
properly posted under state law against trespassing and he 
“supposed he might have been trespassing” when he had gone 
frogging there. 
These allegations do not constitute an injury in fact fairly 
traceable to the clearing of Bowman’s field.  The only direct injury 
is that one of NUWF’s members can no longer illegally use the 
cleared area for frogging.  The inability to continue illegal 
activities cannot give rise to an injury to support standing.  
Moreover, at a deposition, a NUDEP biologist testified that, once 
fully-established, the new, year-round, partially-inundated 
wetland in the buffer zone will provide richer wetland habitat 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol4/iss1/1
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than the former, occasionally-inundated wetland presently 
occupied by the field.  Indeed, it will provide a higher quality 
habitat, and more of it, for frogs. 
The remaining alleged injuries are only speculative.  Indeed, 
considering the richer wetland habitat that will occur in the 
buffer zone, the environment may be benefitted rather than 
injured by the changes.  And, as the three members of NUWF 
testified, the conservation easement effectively shields the field 
from the river, so that the aesthetics of navigational use of the 
river is unaffected. 
IV. NO CONTINUING VIOLATION 
The Supreme Court held in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. 
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49 (1987), that § 505 of the 
CWA requires that alleged violations be continuing or ongoing as 
a matter of subject matter jurisdiction.  Here Bowman’s land 
clearing activities ceased on July 15, 2011 and there is no reason 
to believe he will resume them; he has placed the only remaining 
land he owns in the area in a conservation easement with 
NUDEP.  His only subsequent activities have included planting 
wheat seeds and draining the property through the drainage 
ditch or swale he constructed earlier.  Neither activity constitutes 
adding dredged spoil or fill to the property, nor do plaintiffs allege 
that they constitute such addition.  Plaintiffs allege that the 
continued presence of dredged and fill material in the former 
wetland constitutes a continuing or ongoing violation and some 
courts have so held. See Sasser v. Administrator, 990 F.2d 127 
(4th Cir. 1993).  However, as Jim Bob Bowman testified at 
deposition on another matter, “that pig won’t fly.”  The idea that 
a CWA violation continues unless and until it is undone is 
nonsense.  That would render without meaning the jurisdictional 
requirement for a continuing violation, since all violations would 
be continuing.  It would also obviate application of the statute of 
limitations, for it would never start to run. 
Plaintiff responds that while § 404 violations are continuing 
unless and until the fill material is removed, § 402 violations, 
which Gwaltney addressed, are not.  Plaintiff claims § 402 
violations are irreversible because once pollutants are discharged 
into water they flow away and cannot be removed.  That, 
9
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however, depends on the facts; many § 402 violations involve the 
discharge of solids or sediment which settle on the water bottom 
below or shortly downstream from the outfall and can be 
removed.  Indeed, a number of CERCLA sites involve removal of 
bottom sediment from former point sources, notably the Hudson 
River PCB site. 
Plaintiff’s continuing violation theory is ingenious but cannot 
be credited for it would obviate the continuing violation 
jurisdictional requirement articulated in § 505 of the CWA and 
recognized by the Supreme Court in Gwaltney. 
V.  PRIOR STATE ACTION 
Section 505(b)(1)(B) of the CWA bars a citizen suit if the 
“State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil . . . 
action in a court of the United States . . . to require compliance . . 
.” with the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B).  Here, NUDEP has 
commenced a civil action in a court of the United States.  It 
diligently prosecuted that action by filing a complaint with this 
Court just a month after receiving NUWF’s notice letter and by 
negotiating a settlement with Defendant within a month 
thereafter.  The settlement, embodied in a consent decree 
submitted to this Court for approval, required Bowman to 
immediately cease further violations of § 404 and in lieu of a 
penalty, to deed a conservation easement over a large portion of 
his property, relinquishing its agricultural and development 
value, preserving it in a natural state, and opening it to 
appropriate public use.  The decree also required Bowman to 
construct and maintain a year-round, partially-inundated 
wetland at considerable initial expense and an indeterminable 
future expense.  These measures will preserve the viewscape of 
the Muddy River and enhance the wetlands environment on the 
site.  They will allow Mr. Norton to legally frog in an area that 
eventually will provide an enhanced environment for frogs.  This 
Court finds that NUDEP’s actions meet all of the requirements in 
the statute to bar NUWF’s suit. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol4/iss1/1
  
2013] NELMCC COMPETITION PROBLEM 11 
 
VI. VIOLATION OF § 404 
Section 301(a) of the CWA prohibits “the discharge of any 
pollutant by any person,” except in compliance with a permit 
issued under §§ 402 or 404 of the CWA. Id. § 1311(a).  Section 
502(12) of the CWA defines “discharge of a pollutant” to mean 
“any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point 
source.” Id. § 1362(12).  Section 404 of the CWA authorizes the 
Corps to issue permits “for the discharge of dredged or fill 
materials into the navigable waters.” Id. § 1344.  Section 502 of 
the CWA defines “pollutant,” navigable waters” and “point 
source,” but does not define “addition.”  We will first determine if 
the three defined elements of the offense are met and then 
examine “addition.” Id. § 1362. 
A.  Pollutant 
Section 502(6) defines “pollutant” to mean a list of specific 
and general material, the first of which is “dredged spoil,” Id. § 
1362(6), uncannily close to the “dredged . . . material” the disposal 
of which the Corps is authorized to issue permits for.  The CWA 
does not define “dredged spoil” or “dredged . . . material.” See 33 
U.S.C. § 1362.  Dredging, however, is an activity that occurs on 
open water to excavate a channel or port docking area to make 
them available for commercial navigation.  The activity in this 
case was moving soil and related material from one part of a field 
to another to clear it for agricultural use.  Land clearing is not 
dredging, so we have no dredged spoil to discharge here.  The 
CWA’s definition of “pollutant” does not include “fill material.”  Of 
course, “fill material” may be composed of other pollutants.  The 
tree and leveled vegetation remains, for instance, are “biological 
material,” which is listed as a “pollutant.” Id.  No party contests 
that the material Bowman moved about the property included 
pollutants.  This element is satisfied. 
B.  Point source 
Section 502(14) defines “point source” as “any discernible, 
confined and discrete conveyance,” including a list of examples 
not including “bulldozer.” Id. § 1362(14).  A bulldozer, however, is 
a mechanism designed to convey dirt and other material from one 
11
  
12 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE  [Vol.  4 
 
place to another.  Other courts have held that bulldozers are 
point sources.  See Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 
715 F.2d 897, 927 (5th Cir. 1983).  No party contests that the 
bulldozers were point sources.  This element is satisfied. 
C.  Navigable waters 
Section 502(7) defines “navigable waters” as “the waters of 
the United States,” a singularly unhelpful definition. 33 U.S.C. § 
1362(7).  Contemplating Bowman’s former woods does not conjure 
up the image of navigable waters, supporting waterborne 
transportation.  Nor does it conjure up the image of the Nation’s 
waters.  However, the Supreme Court has held that wetlands 
adjacent to navigable waters are themselves navigable waters. 
See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 139 
(1985).  All the parties agree that the Muddy River is navigable 
water; indeed, it supports recreational navigation.  All the parties 
also agree that Bowman’s former woods met the Corp’s Wetlands 
Delineation Manual criteria for wetlands and that the former 
woods therefore are wetlands.  This element is satisfied. 
D.  Addition 
The CWA does not define “addition.”  EPA and the Corps do 
not define “addition” in their regulations.  EPA has defined 
“addition” in various contexts as “from the outside world.”  Nat’l 
Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1982).  
Here, Bowman pushed pollutants from one part of his former 
woods/wetlands to another part of his former woods/wetlands.  
Bowman did not add the pollutants from outside his former 
woods/wetlands, thus not meeting EPA’s definition of “addition.”  
NUWF protests that EPA developed its “outside world” definition 
as a litigation position in § 402 cases and has never applied it to § 
404 cases.  But the same term used in different parts of the same 
statute has the same meaning, unless Congress clearly provides 
otherwise. See Sorenson v. Sec’y of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851 
(1986).  Congress did not provide otherwise in the CWA; it did not 
indicate that “addition” means one thing for § 402 and another 
thing for § 404.  NUWF argues that Congress did so provide, for 
applying the “outside world” definition to § 404 would read the 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol4/iss1/1
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dredge and fill permit program out of the statute, contrary to 
congressional intent.  NUWF’s argument is plainly not the case; 
the “outside world” definition of “addition” would not read § 404 
out of the statute.  Under the “outside world” definition, the 
dredged spoil or fill material must come from somewhere other 
than the wetland into which it is being placed to require a § 404 
permit.  This is not an unreasonable way to read § 404, 
particularly in recognition of its original intent to provide a 
permitting scheme for disposal of dredged spoil from dredging 
harbors and navigation channels at a considerable distance from 
their point or origin. United States v. Bay-Houston Towing Co., 
Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 596, 604 (E.D. Mich. 1999).  That reading of § 
404 may result in a narrower application of its permitting 
program, but it would not read the program out of existence. 
Alternatively, EPA has interpreted “addition” in its Water 
Transfer Rule to incorporate the “unitary navigable waters” 
theory, under which all navigable waters are one for the purposes 
of § 301(a) of the CWA. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) Water Transfer Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 33,697 (June 
13, 2008) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122).  Bowman argues that 
EPA did so in a regulation, entitling its interpretation to Chevron 
deference, as recognized by the Eleventh Circuit in Friends of the 
Everglades v. South Florida Water Management District. 570 F.3d 
1210 (11th Cir. 2009).  The Eleventh Circuit’s decision is 
particularly relevant because petitions for judicial review of that 
rule have been consolidated in the Eleventh Circuit.  NUWF 
argues EPA’s interpretation of “addition” is not entitled to 
deference because the rule itself does not define “addition” or 
even use the word, and therefore was not an interpretation of the 
CWA made in a formal administrative proceeding. See United 
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2000).  But EPA’s 
interpretation of “addition” in the preamble to the proposed and 
final rule was the very basis of its rule and was subject to the 
public comment that was a part of the rulemaking. 
Under EPA’s interpretation, transferring pollutants from one 
navigable water to a second navigable water does not add those 
pollutants to the second navigable water because the first and 
second navigable waters were always one; the pollutants were 
always in navigable water and therefore could not be added to the 
13
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second navigable water.  NUWF answers that EPA stated the 
unitary navigable waters theory had “no effect on the § 404 
permit program” because the definition of “pollutant” specifically 
included “dredged spoil,” and therefore “explicitly forbade 
discharges of dredged material except as in compliance” with a § 
404 permit.  The inclusion of “dredged spoil” in the definition of 
“pollutant,” however, explicitly forbids nothing; it only satisfies 
one of the four requisite elements.  It has nothing to do with 
“addition.”  NUWF may argue that the unitary theory applies 
only to § 402 and not to § 404.  But, again, words used in a 
statute have the same meaning unless Congress explicitly 
provides otherwise and it has not here. See Sorenseon v. Sec’y of 
the Treasury of the U.S., 475 U.S. 851 (1986). 
Finally, NUWF cites United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331 
(4th Cir. 2000), in which the defendant argued that he added 
nothing to a wetland when he dug a drainage ditch in a wetland 
and sidecast soil removed from the ditch to the adjacent wetland, 
since the soil was already in the wetland.  The government 
argued and the court held that the defendant removed soil from 
the ditch but returned dredged spoil to the wetland, adding a 
pollutant to the wetland where there had been no pollutant 
before.  This imaginative piece of verbal metaphysics only masks 
reality: nothing is added when a defendant moves soil, no matter 
what you call it, a mere few feet within a wetland.  And under 
EPA’s unitary navigable water theory it doesn’t matter that 
defendant moved the soil more than a few feet within the 
wetland.  Nor does it matter that the defendant’s actions changed 
the nature of some of the material from living to dead. See Nat’l 
Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 
1988). 
To be sure, there are any number of decisions holding that 
land clearing activities violate the CWA without a § 404 permit.  
None of them, however, analyzed the full ramifications of EPA’s 
“outside world” interpretation of “addition,” and none of them 
considered EPA’s “unitary navigable waters” theory as it applies 
to “addition.”  Once these two agency interpretations of “addition” 
are considered, it is clear Bowman added nothing to his wetland 
when he moved material from one part of field-in-preparation to 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol4/iss1/1
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another part of the field-in-preparation.  Therefore, this element 
is not satisfied. 
For the reasons stated above, this Court grants Defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment on all counts and denies Plaintiff’s 
motion for summary judgment on all counts: 
1. Plaintiff lacks standing; 
2. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because all 
violations are wholly past; 
3. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction due to prior 
state action; and 
4. There is no violation of the CWA. 
                             
                                                       SO ORDERED. 
                                                       Romulus N. Remus 
                                                       United States District 
Judge 
                                                       June 1, 2012 
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